Recent Posts in CASE LAW Category

In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled a suspect's words can be used against him if he fails to "clearly tell the police that he does not want to talk." 

The case in question involved a male suspect arrested in connection with a shooting, one year prior, outside a Michigan mall which killed one man and left another injured.  According to reports, the suspect was read his rights and verbally indicated he understood those rights but did not sign a waiver of rights form. 

During hours of subsequent interrogation, the suspect said very little; however, when asked "Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?", he responded "Yes."  While he refused to sign a confession or say anything further, he was later convicted of first-degree murder…due in no small part to this single word response. 

In rendering the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy said "[a suspect wishing to invoke his right to remain silent must] do so unambiguously."  Justice Sotomayor, though, strongly dissented, stating "[the ruling] turns Miranda upside down and marks a substantial retreat from the protection against self-incrimination."     

In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld long-established due process principles requiring prosecutors to disclose to the defense any information in the government's possession beneficial to the defendant, including any evidence which may impeach a government witness. 

At issue was the failure of the prosecutor to disclose the criminal history of a witness and the impact such information may have had on the defense's ability to call into question the witness's propensity for truthfulness and honesty.  

While it was unclear as to whether the prosecutor was actually in possession of the information, the Court found his investigators definitely were; thus, the prosecutor could not claim ignorance in order to escape his duty under Brady .

The ruling has led to two Southern California counties having to belatedly send out notices disclosing similar such evidence with regard to a particular criminalist in their employ.  Such impeachment evidence could easily compromise the government's ability to successfully prosecute any cases handled in the crime lab by that criminalist, be they cases involving DUIs, drugs, weapons or murder.         

In a 1999 decision, a California appellate court ruled that a detainee's refusal to consent to a pat-down search does not constitute the reasonable suspicion needed to justify such a search.

The case involved a juvenile detained by an officer for improper lighting on his bicycle.  By all accounts, the juvenile was cooperative until the officer told him he was going to conduct a pat-down search.  At this point, the juvenile refused to consent to the search.  Nonetheless, the officer proceeded with the pat-down, finding a revolver in the juvenile's jacket pocket.

The court reversed the subsequent conviction indicating the reasonable suspicion required to justify the search could not be created by the detainee's attempt to exercise his 4^th Amendment rights.  Further, the court found, under a totality of the circumstances standard, no other specific facts existed to lead the officer to believe the juvenile was armed and dangerous.    

Calling a contrary California Supreme Court ruling in a prior case "wrong", the 9^TH Circuit Court held in 2009 that warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of executing a misdemeanor DUI arrest is not justified under the Emergency/Exigent Circumstance exceptions. 

According to the Court, whose interpretation of the 4^th Amendmentin this case fell in line with that of the United States Supreme Court, there must be an objectively reasonable belief that an immediate need to protect an occupant from serious harm exists…and, in this case, the officer's claim he entered the home to make sure the driver was not injured in the accident was "absurd" considering the law enforcement report noted there was no damage to the vehicle.  The Court further rejected the officer's alternate argument he entered the home without a warrant because he "believed" the man may be suffering from a diabetic coma.

In its decision, the Court explicitly stated that a minor hit-and-run accident without injury does not sanction a warrantless entry into a home.  Additionally, the Court noted, as required under the principles of the Federal Constitution, an officer must have independent probable cause to lawfully affect an arrest authorized by a private citizen pursuant to California Penal Code Section 837.

A 2009 Supreme Court ruling made it unconstitutional to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, without probable cause to believe said vehicle contains evidence linked to the arrest, in cases where the driver was in custody and without immediate access to the car's interior.

While promising in theory, law enforcement will likely get around this restriction by simply providing a host of new boilerplate explanations to justify such vehicle searches.    

A 2009 Court of Appeals case ruled partition ratio variability evidence is admissible to defend clients against impairment charges under Vehicle Code Section 23152(a), forcing the California Supreme Court to address this long avoided issue. 

Rather than making a determination as to what constitutes a sufficient foundation to admit such evidence, however, the California Supreme Court left it up to the lower courts to resolve.  In making rulings on admissibility, the courts then are likely to be faced with numerous considerations including: unknown variables (drinking pattern, temperature, hematocrit level, atmospheric pressure, etc.), whether law enforcement can perform experiments on the defendant and, if so, what about the defendant who is a recovering alcoholic trying to remain sober?, whether under the age of 21 defendants will receive a fair trial given they cannot legally participate in scientific experiments and is there evidence by the People that a .08 percent or higher blood alcohol level establishes impairment?

Given the range of variables and replication impossibilities, it is likely only partition ratio variability evidence pertaining to the general population will be admitted in defending against impairment charges in DUI cases, while partition ratio variability evidence pertaining to the individual will be excluded.     

In a February 2010 decision, the California Court of Appeals ruled a defendant cannot be convicted of stealing and receiving the same property.

In the case at issue, Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 were charged with grand theft and receiving stolen property after allegedly stealing a purse containing a credit card as well as a cell phone and, subsequently, using a stolen credit card to purchase items from three different stores.

Defendant 2 pled guilty to the crimes and maintained she was the one who actually made the purchases.  Nonetheless, Defendant 1 was convicted at trial of felony receiving stolen property and misdemeanor petty theft.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant 1’s receiving stolen property conviction, however, overturned the theft conviction.  In its decision, the Court reasoned there was a stronger case against Defendant 1 with regard to the charge of receiving stolen property versus the theft and, as the property was not properly differentiated within each charge, she could not be convicted of both counts.      

The California Supreme Court recently ruled a prosecutor’s use of a Power Point presentation depicting a jigsaw puzzle of the Statue of Liberty to define  reasonable doubt constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

In the case at issue, the Defendant was convicted of domestic violence under  Penal Code Section 273.5 with a prison prior.  He was sentenced to four years in state prison.  On appeal, the Defendant argued the Power Point presentation used during the prosecutor’s closing argument to exemplify the  reasonable doubt standard was improper and urged the jury to conclude “where there’s smoke there’s fire.”  

As explained in the decision, the visual presentation showed six pieces of an eight piece puzzle being assembled piece by piece on the screen which was “immediately and easily recognizable as the Statue of Liberty.”  Before finally adding the last two pieces, the prosecutor noted “we know this picture is beyond a reasonable doubt without looking at all the pieces of that picture.  We know that that’s a picture of the Statue of Liberty, we don’t need all the pieces of it.” 

The Court found this to be clear misstatement of the law which served to lessen the reasonable doubt standard required under the  Constitution to one which “invites the jurors to guess or jump to a conclusion.”  

Despite this finding, the Court found the presentation did not prejudice the Defendant given the facts in this particular case and, thus, affirmed the judgment.  They did, however, offer this warning: “Nevertheless, we caution prosecutors who are tempted to enliven closing argument with visual aids that using such aids to illustrate the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is dangerous and unwise.”     

The United States Supreme Court recently heard arguments concerning the Miranda warning and the nature of one’s right to an attorney.

The issue centers on a case involving a Florida man convicted of possession of a firearm.  At the time of his interrogation, the man signed a written waiver of rights which included the phrase “You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions.  If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning.  You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.”  The man subsequently confessed to buying the gun on the street for protection.    

At the heart of the defendant’s argument is the assertion he was of the belief he no longer had the right to an attorney and/or to have an attorney in the interrogation room once the questioning began.  The lower court ruled in his favor and overturned the conviction, finding the police did not adequately make clear to the defendant he had the right to have an attorney with him during questioning. 

By all accounts, it appears Justices Breyer and Sotomayor may be leaning toward upholding the lower court’s ruling, questioning the clarity of the advisement given to the defendant.  Justice Scalia, however, is not so convinced likening the defendant’s argument to “angels dancing on the head of a pin.” 

This case is but one of three Miranda warning cases currently before the court.  It is anticipated rulings in these matters will be handed down next year.

Miranda rights resulted from the 1963 case of Ernesto Miranda who was convicted of kidnap and rape after confessing to police.  In 1966, the United States Supreme Court ruled the confession could not be used as evidence against him because he had not been advised of his rights.

The United States Court of Appeals recently upheld a sentence imposing a lifetime term of supervision for a convicted pedophile.

The case, which stemmed from a law enforcement sting designed to target adults using the Internet to solicit sexual acts with minors, involved a man charged with “traveling with the intent to engage in a sexual act with a juvenile.”  The defense argued the defendant did not intend to engage in sex acts with a juvenile, but rather, intended only to engage in role-playing with an adult female pretending to be a child.  The defendant, however, was convicted and sentenced to a five year term with five years of supervised release.    

The conviction was subsequently overturned due to the improper admission of evidence.  At retrial, the defendant was again convicted.  This time, though, the court imposed a sentence of lifetime supervised release.  The defendant appealed this harsher sentence claiming it was a vindictive sentence which should be reversed in favor of the original five year term of supervised release. 

On review, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the sentence finding such a sentence is not vindictive when “grounded in evidence and designed to protect the public.”  In outlining their decision, the court stated:

“To be vindictive and thus impermissible, a sentence must be designed to punish the individual for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.  Also, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the sentence was the product of actual vindictiveness.” 

In considering the present case, the appellate court found these circumstances did not exist given 1) the prosecution sought the same sentence in both trials, 2) the defendant, a magician with access to minors, was likely to reoffend, and 3) the trial court found his defense to be disingenuous.  Thus, the trial court was proper in imposing the sentence.

According to a November 2009 decision by the California Court of Appeals, a pursuing police officer is not required to be behind the suspect’s vehicle in order to justify a conviction of evading a police officer under Vehicle Code Section 2800.2.

In the case at issue, the defendant, driving on a highway, crashed into a car driven by an off-duty officer and failed to stop after the accident.  The officer reported the accident to police dispatch and followed the defendant’s vehicle.  The defendant eventually exited the highway and proceeded to drive the wrong way down a one-way street.  At this time, an on-duty patrol officer observed the traffic violation, turned on his lights and sirens and attempted to stop the defendant by using his vehicle to block an intersection ahead of the defendant.  The defendant, however, cleared the intersection and continued to violate numerous traffic laws.  Ultimately, the defendant was arrested and charged in violation of Vehicle Code Section 2800.2-Evading a Police Officer.  He was found guilty by a jury and sentenced, in part, to a four year term. 

Vehicle Code Section 2800.2 states “if a driver flees a pursuing officer and the pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for safety, the driver shall be punished by imprisonment.”  In challenging his conviction, the defendant argued it was necessary that the “pursuing” officer be behind him in order to justify a conviction under Section 2800.2.  The Court, however, interpreted the statute’s word “pursue” to include “the concept of overtaking for capture”, thus, does not require an officer to be behind the suspect.  That is, the pursuit was commenced when the officer activated his lights and sirens and blocked the intersection regardless of whether or not he was behind the defendant’s vehicle. 

Despite this finding, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction concluding the four year prison term should have been stayed.